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1 The Challenges of Nuclear Learning in South Asia  
Feroz Khan and Ryan Jacobs 
 
he sustainability of strategic stability in South Asia remains of the highest importance to 
U.S. national security policy. The South Asian Nuclear Learning project was accordingly 
conceived to examine the region’s nuclear experiences after the 1998 tests.  The end of the 
first decade (1998-2008) represented a good starting point. Later, the project expanded to 
further analyze the nuclear learning curve in the next decade, when security environment and 
technological innovations undertook major shifts. The National Nuclear Security Administration 
sponsored this research, which involved selected scholars and experts from Pakistan, India and 
United States. Some of these contributors also helped shape their state’s nuclear decisions in the 
earlier period following the nuclear tests.  
Learning, in general, regards change or evolution in existing paradigms “as a result of the 
observation and interpretation of experience.”1 Nuclear learning simply inserts the complexities of 
nuclear weapons into the discussion. The project initially conceived of learning as a simple and 
observable phenomenon; however, it soon became clear that we had to define what it meant to learn 
in a complex fashion. We had to ask: Who learns? At what level (individual, institutions, or states)? 
In the realm of South Asian nuclear learning, this was no easy task.  The following pages represent a 
partial answer to how South Asia has learned to live with nuclear weapons and what obstacles lie 
ahead.   
The Road to Nuclear Learning: What is it?  Who Learns? What Matters? 
Before delving into South Asia’s specific nuclear experiences, some conceptual-level insights will 
address the questions posed above and will help frame the following analysis. Unsurprisingly, new 
nuclear weapon states often arrive on the world stage without prior experience in conceptualizing 
how these weapons interact with a country’s security strategy. This lack of experience tends to 
complicate the learning process and provide opportunities at multiple levels of learning. Thus, no 
clear consensus emerges from the theoretical literature on the issue and contributors to this project 
tended to link different levels of learning without assigning definitive values to them. Individual-
based nuclear learning does not automatically disengage the state. Instead, individual learning 
occurring within organizations can be institutionalized through standard operating procedures and 
other methods. If observers employ a comprehensive picture of the learning pathway, states also can 
and do learn. 
1 Jack S. Levy, “Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping A Conceptual Minefield,” International Organization 48, 
no. 2 (Spring 1994): 283. 
T 
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What constitutes learning? Building on research 
by Jeffery Knopf and others, an answer can be 
outlined in two categories. Factual learning 
consists of the empirical facts associated with 
nuclear weapons – numbers, types and 
capabilities of various weapon systems. 
Inferential learning involves the lessons learned 
and applied to policy decisions. By way of 
distinction for example, “the effects of a nuclear 
detonation are important for factual learning,” 
while “what it means to employ nuclear weapons 
for political purposes is a matter of inferential 
learning.”2 
The normative goals of nuclear learning also tend 
to change based on whom is questioned. For 
instance, Pakistani tactical nuclear weapons 
(TNWs) development might be considered 
correct, simple learning for the tactical puzzle-
faced. Nonetheless, for more complex learning 
associated with strategic stability, TNW 
development can constitute incorrect learning 
since these weapons can prolong and intensify 
security dilemmas. The inherently contested 
nature of nuclear learning laid out above 
demonstrates that policymakers must be aware of 
the dangers posed by biases.3 
A common discourse might help navigate 
effectively through biases.  To assist, the project 
identified some similar characterizations from 
South Asia’s diverse scholarly community, such 
as the shared use of factual and inferential 
learning. One should note, however, that scholars 
did not always use the same terminology for the 
same concept. For instance, the term adaptation 
corresponded with simple learning where there 
is a change of means change but not a change in 
the overarching goals. 
2 Jeffery Knopf, “The Concept of Nuclear Learning,” Nonproliferation Review 19, no. 1 (March 2012): 79-93. 
3 Peter Lavoy, remarks during keynote address during Nuclear Learning workshop, Second Iteration, Bangkok, 
Thailand, May 15-17, 2012. 
Breaking Myths to Further Learning 
Dr. Peter Lavoy- 
Myth 1: Track two, non-governmental, 
and academic gatherings do not matter  
Policymakers mistakenly believe responsibility for 
problem solving lays with themselves. Yet, track twos 
are critical for three reasons: 1) They enable small 
steps, which create domestic awareness for the need to 
develop solutions; 2) allow states to share perspectives 
on how they conceive reality differently without track 
one limitations, which provides more space to find 
innovative solutions; and 3) enable participants to 
capture a comprehensive and easily implementable 
package of ideas difficult to achieve in interagency 
and track one meetings.  
Myth 2: Governments do not learn 
Government can learn even if it rarely does; however, 
conditions must be right. Two are important for 
complex learning: 1) Leadership matters. Learning 
is quite hard if new assumptions are based off an 
accumulation of past decisions, but good leaders 
challenge fundamental assumptions and foster a 
culture of learning. And, 2) Good leaders help but 
they must also work in an organization that 
institutionalizes learning and retains a dynamic 
character, which incentivizes challenging assumptions 
and revaluating goals. 
Myth 3: The automaticity of stability or 
instability upon the introduction of 
nuclear weapons 
One should not assume instability or stability is 
automatic when nuclear weapons are introduced. 
Accepting the reality of nuclear weapons should be 
more important than condemning new nuclear states 
for breaking non-proliferation norms. Instead, 
established nuclear powers must share experiences 
with new ones to enable effective nuclear learning 
that ensures strategic stability.3 
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Models coexist with an ever-present criticism of their applicability to new or somehow different 
situations.  This is no different in the South Asian case. Research into the second decade of nuclear 
learning found that both sides recognized the existence of deterrence models and more general, 
potentially applicable, Cold War nuclear experiences. Yet, Indian and Pakistani scholars only warily 
appreciated the potential for learning from or adapting these models and processes to their 
circumstances. The Indian scholars also indicated that Cold War, NATO – Warsaw Pact era models 
were not designed for an adversary willing to use sub-conventional, terrorist tactics. Even without the 
benefits of history, however, nuclear learning in South Asia can still produce tangible consequences 
or examples of progress. A few examples include pushes to improve doctrine, command and control 
(C2), safety and security, and conceptual understandings. Keeping the above foundational knowledge 
in mind, we can now ask how nuclear learning has or has not occurred in South Asia.  
Learning Pathways in South Asia 
South Asia’s first decade saw a limited war and various military and political crises inhibit lasting 
efforts toward peace and security. In the nuclear realm, technological maturation and the 
development of reliable nuclear forces progressed slowly while crises interrupted nuclear learning at 
every turn. Despite these interruptions, however, both sides demonstrated lessons learned.  
Five major inflection points during the first decade framed South Asia’s nuclear learning pathway: 1) 
1998 nuclear tests, 2) Kargil War, 3) 2001-2002 military standoff, 4) revelations regarding A.Q. 
Khan, and 5) Mumbai terrorist attacks. 
The 1998 Nuclear Tests 
Domestic politics represented the single most important factor in the 1998 tests, but threat 
perceptions also compelled changes in security policies. Decision makers in India, captivated by the 
ideal of their country’s rise, concluded that India’s newfound status should be coupled with coming 
out of the nuclear closet. In this light, nuclear weapons were seen as the chief currency of power on 
the world stage. In turn, Pakistan’s reaction originated from the leadership’s fears that no response to 
the perceived Indian provocations would be domestic political suicide. After the tests, neither country 
was well-prepared for the implications of becoming declared nuclear powers.  
The Kargil War 
The 1999 conflict over Kargil defined the India-Pakistan relationship for years to come. Due to the 
international sympathy for India’s rising power position generated; its leaders were pleasantly 
surprised by the outcome. Pakistan, on the other hand, was rudely shaken by international 
condemnation and isolation. Kargil also engendered a deeper debate within South Asian policy and 
academic circles regarding two related nuclear concepts developed during the Cold War: Glenn 
Snyder’s strategic instability paradox and Robert Jervis’s nuclear revolution. Building on Peter 
Lavoy’s research, the project found that Kargil represented a lack of nuclear learning in both India 
and Pakistan. For better or worse, Kargil led to new doctrinal learning on both sides. In India, Kargil 
validated the potential for limited war under a nuclear umbrella and led decision makers to call for a 
declared nuclear doctrine. In Pakistan, policymakers came to see a clear articulation of effective C2 
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as more critical than a declared nuclear doctrine. Thus, India chose a declared doctrine of no-first use 
(NFU) with little articulation of its C2 structure while Pakistan chose to retain an undeclared option 
of first-use combined with well-defined C2.4  
The 2001-2002 Military Standoff  
Nuclear learning does not occur in a static environment and the pace of change in the region affected 
India and Pakistan’s learning process. The terror attacks of 9/11 and the subsequent U.S. military 
intervention in Afghanistan affected Indian and Pakistani security postures. Therefore, the 2001-2002 
standoff tested India’s theorizing on limited war under the nuclear umbrella. Both sides learned 
different and exaggerated lessons from the crisis. India learned that a prolonged military mobilization 
could prevent a surprise attack and compel positive shifts in Pakistani policy – in the long run this led 
to Cold Start. Pakistan learned that its combined counter-mobilization and nuclear capability 
effectively deterred India.5 The more important question, however, was whether both sides prevented 
war on their own or an exogenous variable, such as international intervention, diffused the crisis.6  
Revelations Regarding A.Q. Khan 
The unraveling of A.Q. Khan’s proliferation network presented a significant shock to Pakistan’s 
standing in the international community. Coming on the heels of Kargil, Pakistan faced a huge 
challenge in repairing its international image. Conversely, this crisis helped India because it was 
already seen as a victim of conventional aggression after Kargil and ongoing non-state actor attacks. 
After A.Q. Khan, India also maintained a cleaner image on nonproliferation. As a result of these 
challenges, Pakistani learning was heavily impacted and its priorities shifted even more to creating a 
tightly controlled nuclear C2, where management and accountability reigned supreme. Despite the 
various challenges facing India and Pakistan in the first half of the decade, some positive nuclear 
learning also occurred. For a period of five years from 2003-2008, both countries made a concerted 
effort to forge a structure of peace, security, and détente –during which time no war broke out.7 
The Mumbai Terrorist Attacks 
This positive learning curve suffered a paralyzing shock from the Mumbai attacks. The level of 
distrust and anger from the incident seeped into the learning process and the intensity of this distrust 
now shapes the attitude both countries have towards one another. Indians believe elements within the 
4 See a detailed and comprehensive analysis of the Kargil Conflict and its aftermath in Peter Lavoy ed., Asymmetric 
Warfare in South Asia: The Causes and Consequences of the Kargil Conflict (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009). 
5 For a comprehensive analysis see Zachary Davis ed., The India- Pakistan Military Standoff:” Crises and 
Escalation in South Asia (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011). 
6 This dynamic came to be known as yet another paradox – the independence-dependence paradox. See Feroz H. 
Khan, “The Independence-Dependence Paradox: Stability Dilemmas in South Asia,” Arms Control Today (October 
2003). 
7 For a detailed assessment of AQ Khan network and its impact see, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 
Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q Khan and the Rise of Proliferation Networks, A Net Assessment (London: 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2007). Also see Feroz Hassan Khan, Eating Grass: The Making of the 
Pakistani Bomb (Stanford University Press, 2012), 162-173;359-376  
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Pakistani state harbor deep grievances and hope to derail the peace process due to vested interests. 
Pakistanis have become equally hardened in their belief that India’s grand strategy to keep the 
country week rests in the determination to destroy Pakistan’s military potential. These shared 
conspiratorial mindsets negatively affect the learning process.  
Where South Asian Learning Stood: A Decade after the Test 
Ultimately, these five inflection points and a cumulative assessment of the nuclear experience in the 
first decade highlight a potentially destabilizing lack of adequate learning. These are encapsulated 
more clearly through nine major conclusions: 
• India and Pakistan lack a shared assessment of each other’s nuclear capabilities.  
• Both countries do not fully comprehend the motives driving the adversary’s force modernization 
goals.  
• No mutual understanding of escalation dynamics. Pakistan does not fully comprehend how its 
domestic negligence and perceived complicity regarding asymmetric threats to India can result in 
a conventional war. Conversely, India believes it can wage a limited conventional war and 
control escalation without crossing Pakistani nuclear thresholds  
• Political leaders in both countries do not fully grasp critical nuclear issues and the subtleties 
required to refine policy discourse and decision making. 
• Polemics and media hype undermine serious discussion on nuclear behavior, security policy, and 
the dangers involved in rhetorical and overt threats. 
• Both countries are committed to minimum deterrent postures; however, both continue force 
modernization and develop a strategic triad while leaving arsenal size requirements undefined. 
• Pakistan was more advanced in operationalizing its nuclear deterrent and integrating it with its 
conventional military plans, while India lagged in most categories of nuclear force development 
and clearly articulated command systems. 
• Bilateral communications need improvement to manage crises and prevent escalation. Existing 
arrangements helped avoid misunderstandings in peacetime but did not contain crises. 
• Almost all crises were diffused through U.S. intervention and active involvement. 
Where South Asian Learning is Heading: The Next Decade     
The second decade dawned amidst the mixed baggage of its forerunner. While distrust deepened, 
new factors began to affect the learning process. First, structural changes in the region’s geopolitics 
applied pressure on Indian and Pakistani policymaking. Second, new security doctrines began to 
emerge, which incorporated India’s Cold Start and Pakistani TNWs. And finally, both sides initiated 
major force modernization programs where technological maturation enabled more fissile material, 
delivery systems, and improved intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. 
Have these changes brought more stability or less? The second iteration of the Nuclear Learning in 
South Asia project aimed to answer these questions.  
Pakistan and India remained outside the mainstream of the nuclear age. Thus, they were novices 
when it came to adopting the norms of behavior that nuclear weapon powers upheld. Both countries 
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existed primarily outside non-proliferation regimes and lacked a prior history in nuclear weapons 
before 1998. Hence, they entered into the nuclear era relatively unacquainted with their atypical 
status and its ramifications. States learn by doing, and this trial and error approach to nuclear learning 
appeared analogous to South Asia’s experience at lower escalation levels. In particular, our research 
highlighted the odd utility of Indo-Pak iterative brinksmanship. This approach instigated lesson 
learning in both countries as information on red lines and the limits of security policies were learned 
through crises.  
In particular, the 2001-2002 crises were consistently exhibited as one example. To an extent, while 
Pakistan learned about Indian resolve in response to alleged proxy threats, India realized the limits of 
action under Pakistan’s nuclear shadow. This iterative brinksmanship erupted in a quick succession 
of events, which led some to believe that the timescales involved were too quick to permit adequate 
learning.8 New Delhi’s interactions with Islamabad over the last few decades also taught that India’s 
most effective weapon against Pakistani malfeasance was a reliance on shaming Pakistan in global 
public opinion for supposed deviant behavior, which many in the international community could 
bandwagon due to a shared aversion to terrorism. This reliance on the international community also 
intersects with the processes that both sides learned to utilize in the case of deterrence spirals, 
whereby third party conflict mitigation was required to forego escalation. Lastly, despite the 
existence of epistemic communities in both states focused on nuclear weapons, scholars found no 
agreement on whether these groupings helped or hurt efforts toward stability. What almost all could 
agree on, however, was the likely destabilizing effects of technological maturation. 
Technological Maturation and India-Pakistan Strategic Stability 
Technological maturation presents India and Pakistan with a problem of monumental proportions. 
Yet, neither side has truly come to grips with the precarious consequences of their strategic 
competition – evidenced by their mutual pride regarding nuclear weapons. This so-called nuclear 
nationalism, however, more easily supports capability acquisitions rather than doctrinal innovation. 
In other words, both states are acquiring new capabilities without involving much strategic 
forethought into their decision making. Technological competition, therefore, overwhelms prudence 
in regards to stability on the subcontinent and can instigate an arms race spiral that will be difficult to 
terminate.  
Five major technological innovations in South Asia have complicated the learning process between 
India and Pakistan due to their impact on stability: 1) Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD), 2) Multiple 
Independent Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs), 3) Sea-based Deterrents, 4) Battlefield Nuclear Weapons 
(BNW), and 5) Cruise Missiles. Two out of these five innovations are extremely destabilizing (BMD 
and BNW); the others could either be destabilizing or stabilizing. In the first decade, fewer strategic 
delivery systems existed. In the second decade, the increased number and variety of delivery means 
is seemingly driving doctrinal change, which inhibits effective learning.  
8 Zachary Davis, ed. The India- Pakistan Military Standoff: Crises and Escalation in South Asia (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 229-235. 
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In particular, BMD has become a critical new nuisance that seems set to threaten current or future 
conflict dynamics in the region. Claims from India’s Defense Research Development Organisation 
(DRDO) of a deployable BMD system are somewhat questionable at best. Yet, BMD impacts 
Pakistani threat perceptions because, in the long term, it compromises the perceived effectiveness of 
Pakistani nuclear weapons. Islamabad considers that the offense-defense balance will tilt toward 
India. A protective shield, real or imagined, provides Indian decision makers an umbrella from which 
to engage in provocative acts. Thus, Pakistan’s countervailing strategies involve further technological 
innovations such as MIRVs, decoys, and increased fissile and ballistic missile stocks. This dynamic 
also incentivizes Pakistan to develop BNWs and cruise missiles. At best, this interaction represents 
simple learning of an action-reaction character, which can hinder the chance for more transformative 
learning.  
Some believe BMD emanates more from India’s prideful scientific establishment than its strategic 
decision makers. India’s various cooperative defense agreements with other nations in the BMD 
game – Russia, the United States, and Israel – also alarm Pakistani decision makers. After all, Israel’s 
recent Iron Dome demonstrations highlight the potential for missile defense systems to negate a 
weaker adversary’s advantages in combat. Thus, the introduction of BMD, even if only for point 
defense, has the potential to upset stability by eroding mutual vulnerability. The perceived erosion of 
mutual vulnerability relates back to concerns that factual nuclear learning has not yet entered the 
public domain in both countries. For uneducated publics, BMD increases the sense of invincibility 
even though it may not provide an invulnerable shield.  
One further threat to strategic stability emanates from another DRDO pet project: MIRVs. Although 
technically feasible, MIRVs could significantly increase India’s ability to engage numerous Pakistani 
nuclear targets and thus limit the damage from retaliatory strikes. If deployed, this could provoke a 
potentially unstable arms race dynamic. In a democratic system, this perception can place 
inopportune pressure on decision makers to engage in dangerous acts. 
A more comprehensive examination of the ongoing technological processes highlights both sides’ 
moves toward a secure second strike capability, which arguably can be more stabilizing. In 
particular, comparative increases in weapon numbers with parallel efforts to increase survivability 
through a larger and more dispersed deployment of delivery devices such as ballistic missile 
submarines (SSBNs) (India’s Arihant class) and longer range missiles (Pakistan’s  Shaheen family of 
missiles) should lead to mutually assured destruction. This does not necessarily imply a less 
confrontational South Asian future will occur; however, its existence must be mutually accepted in 
Pakistan and India. The pattern of learning so far examined in South Asia, points to iterative 
brinksmanship games that produce nuclear learning only at the conclusion of crises.  
Some foresee a troubled road ahead for India and Pakistan at lower levels of the use of force 
spectrum, including the potential employment of BNWs as war-termination devices. Principally, this 
prognosis owes conceptual homage to Glenn Snyder’s stability-instability paradox. Simply put, as 
both sides’ develop more systems for conventional and tactical nuclear use under the umbrella of 
strategic stability, the chances for conflict below a strategic nuclear exchange increases. There will 
likely be a high confidence that these lower levels of force will not escalate to a strategic nuclear 
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exchange. Platforms with a latent potential for miniaturized nuclear warheads – such as tactical 
missile systems and cruise missiles –deployed at readier states of alert will help push this dynamic. 
Specific systems include Pakistan’s Nasr multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) and Babur cruise 
missile, and India’s Prahaar MLRS and BrahMos cruise missile.  
One additional factor regards China’s primary place in Indian nuclear strategy. This inherently means 
that capability developments fashioned with Beijing in mind affect the Indo-Pak nuclear relationship. 
Therefore, the technological competition in South Asia is multidirectional. Nuclear learning on the 
subcontinent must be understood from a wider prism, which includes Sino-Indian nuclear interaction. 
In South Asia, technological maturation complicates nuclear learning. Cold War lessons that brought 
about strategic stability are lost because doctrinal thinking becomes too complex given the ever 
growing impact of disruptive technologies. In the end, both sides are likely to spend themselves into 
an unwinnable and distracting arms competition. While such a race might be affordable for 
superpowers, South Asian states have less resources and more pressing domestic fissures to resolve. 
Ideally, decisions on doctrine and C2 should precede widespread force modernization. However, this 
sequence is always difficult to achieve – as was the case in the first nuclear age.   
Strengths and Weaknesses in South Asian C2, Doctrine, and Arms Control 
Nuclear doctrines exist at the policy and operational level to define how and under what 
circumstances the employment of nuclear weapons should be considered. On a practical basis, 
however, understandings of doctrine do not need to complement each other at different levels and 
opposing doctrines do not always suit one another since this prevents unhealthy doctrinal 
competition. Once again, the India and Pakistan’s peculiar structural positions suggest different 
nuclear weapon doctrinal outlooks. Although these doctrines borrow from Cold War experiences and 
thus represent some form of mutual learning, lessons are applied into a unique structural reality. India 
retains evident conventional military and resource superiority in the South Asian dyad and 
consequently can afford a more benign, yet declared doctrine. Pakistan, on the other hand, considers 
a more ambiguous, undeclared doctrine advantageous since its weapons are designed to offset India’s 
conventional forces and the general structural – or geophysical – imbalance.  
Indian Doctrine 
New Delhi’s attempts at making its doctrine’s principal attributes clear have been muddled; however, 
India’s doctrine seems relatively discernible compared to Pakistan’s direct policy of ambiguity.  
India treats nuclear devices as political weapons and revolves around a NFU policy with credible 
minimum deterrence. Thus, New Delhi maintains its nuclear forces to threaten massive punitive 
retaliation if India suffers a first strike. To remain credible, Indian forces need to be survivable and 
effective, which leads policymakers to opt for a triad force structure. By design, almost any decisions 
on nuclear weapons are made by India’s civilian political leadership.  
Despite rhetoric of peaceful intent and civilian control, Indian doctrine has not been wholly perceived 
as de-escalatory. An ever-increasing reliance on new and technologically sophisticated weapons and 
related devices still leads some to accuse India of adopting a maximalist rather than minimalist 
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nuclear posture. For example, movement toward SSBNs might compel an undersea arms race despite 
India’s intended deterrent. Perhaps a more troubling debate surrounds India’s NFU policy. Although 
Indian officials consistently signal adherence to NFU, hawks as well as India’s National Security 
Advisory Board have recently recommended serious reconsideration of the doctrine. Two primary 
reasons drive these calls: 1) Other nuclear powers do not accept Indian NFU on faith and 2) NFU 
involves inherent and catastrophic costs if deterrence should fail, e.g. a Pakistani first strike on an 
Indian metropolis or forces in the battlefield.  
The consequences of an Indian reversal on NFU carry significant risks for strategic stability and may 
represent learning in the wrong direction. A first-use doctrine has its own inherent risks. India’s 
potential adversaries possess second-strike capabilities and a first-use posture would require 
significant, costly modifications regarding resource investments and decision-making authorities 
which may not sit well with India’s political elites. Moreover, India’s doctrine and status provides 
certain benefits like the ability to stand on the subjective moral high ground and shame Pakistan on 
the international stage. In the long run, China poses future doctrinal difficulties. Given the growing 
power gap in both the conventional and nuclear realms, New Delhi may one day find itself in a 
similar situation to Pakistan – a more capable opponent that requires an asymmetric, ambiguous, and 
hair-trigger posture to deter irredentism.  
Pakistani Nuclear Doctrine 
A comprehensive understanding of Pakistan’s doctrine would require access and archives, neither of 
which suits its outwardly ambiguous approach. Yet, the doctrine – regardless of the specifics – has 
evolved since Kargil. Hopefully, the lessons Pakistan learns from its iterative brinksmanship games 
with India – contextualized by historical animosity and realpolitik – may move towards positive 
doctrinal innovations.  
Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine evolved under a military-dominated system during its formative nuclear 
years.  Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are often attributed to contain five major elements of its strategy 
and three additional roles that have obvious doctrinal consequences. Peter Lavoy surmises five 
dimensions to its deterrent policy: 1) an effective conventional fighting force augmented by nuclear 
weapons as last-resort weapons to prevent military defeat or loss of territory; 2) a minimum 
deterrence doctrine and force posture; 3) an adequate stockpile of nuclear weapons and delivery 
systems to provide for an assured second strike ; 4) a survivable strategic force capable of 
withstanding sabotage and conventional military attacks; 5) a robust strategic command and control 
apparatus designed to ensure tight negative use control during peacetime and prompt operational 
readiness ( positive control) at times of crises and war.9  At times, additional roles to the acquisition 
of nuclear capabilities are attributed such as: facilitator of low-intensity conflict; tool for 
internationalizing disputes; and tool for providing extended deterrence.10  
9 Peter R Lavoy, “Islamabad Nuclear Posture: Its Premises and Implementation” in Pakistan’s Nuclear Future: 
Worries Beyond War, ed. Henry L Sokolski (Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, 2008), 131. 
10 For detailed analysis of roles of nuclear weapons see Feroz Hassan Khan and Peter R Lavoy, “Pakistan: The 
Dilemma of Nuclear Deterrence,” in The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia, ed. 
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These roles remain hotly contested and some obvious lessons affect their perceived efficacy. For 
instance, Pakistan’s weapons are unable to favorably internationalize its dispute with India. Kargil 
and the 2001-2002 standoff highlighted a doctrinal failure in advantageously raising territorial issues. 
Throughout the decade this has only become clearer as India’s de facto nuclear status has grown. 
Obviously, a deeper understanding of how Pakistan measures the success of its doctrine is necessary. 
For example, Pakistan only developed TNWs after democratic transitions had successfully taken 
root. The first short-range battlefield nuclear weapons, commonly referred to as TNWs, were 
introduced in 2011.  
Theoretically, TNWs are meant to provide more flexible responses for policymakers and therefore 
enhance deterrence credibility. Thus, Pakistan in one way or another has begun incorporating TNWs 
into its wider doctrine. Since any significant Indian response to provocations would seem to cross 
Pakistani redlines, flexibility comes with an escalatory cost. The deployment of TNWs also has 
negative consequences for doctrinal transparency. Yet, the military and resource imbalance between 
India and Pakistan likely means Pakistani transparency will remain out of reach. With mutually 
escalatory doctrines facing off on the plains of India and Pakistan, instability at the tactical level will 
likely increase.  
India’s doctrinal response, however, has come from the conventional world. Cold Start is designed 
not to break Pakistani red lines; instead, it calls for the launching of integrated battle groups into 
Pakistan in order to achieve limited military and political objectives. These incursions come with a 
concomitant employment of indirect fire meant to retard Pakistan’s conventional reserves. 
Altogether, Cold Start is meant to communicate a more credible and flexible response option to 
Pakistani proxy activity and to counter Pakistani short lines of communication within its territory. 
Yet, South Asia’s tit-for-tat doctrinal innovations have developed into a spiral dynamic fed by 
capability developments. Thus, Pakistan’s doctrinal response has raised the stakes for any 
conventional, cross-border attacks. To India, this implies a shield for waging proxy war. This cycle 
of misperceptions and action-reaction has inhibited any positive learning in the region. Outside 
influence or intervention to break this cycle has remained unsuccessful.  
Muthiah Alagappa (Stanford University Press, 2008), 215- 240; Peter Lavoy, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Doctrine,” in 
Prospects for Peace In South Asia, eds. Rafiq Dossani and Henry S. Rowen (Hyderabad, India: Orient Longman, 
2005), 280-300; Also see S. Paul Kapur, Dangerous Deterrent: Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and Conflict in 
South Asia (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007).  
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Command and Control  
As a means to a state’s deterrent interests, C2 
mechanisms ensure the appropriate and 
authorized use or nonuse of nuclear weapons. 
Both India and Pakistan require robust C2 
systems to ensure their nuclear deterrent, but 
given their differing political structures, the 
makeup of both countries’ systems necessarily 
diverges. 
India’s C2 arrangements reflect the 
shortcomings of its nuclear development, 
planning, decision making, and doctrine. 
Despite recent progress operationalizing 
nuclear capabilities, nuclear C2 remains 
embedded in complex political and 
bureaucratic structures, which raise questions 
about the efficacy of India’s Nuclear 
Command Authority (NCA) to produce timely 
decisions, especially in a crisis. Military 
officials have little if any independent 
authorities on nuclear weapons, while 
technical experts connected to political leaders 
manage critical C2 functions. Slowly but 
surely, India is learning to build a more 
regularized C2 structure with “dual-rule” 
release procedures and other innovations, but 
unnecessary opacity still stymies effective 
deterrence through visibly robust and 
redundancy. Not surprisingly, New Delhi is 
not alone in facing an unsettled C2 
environment.  
Pakistan’s nuclear C2 lies in the military portfolio. The effects of this centralization remain 
debatable. The 1998 tests prompted development of a Strategic Plans Division (SPD) and Army 
Strategic Forces Command that were supported by a cadre of experts to ensure continuity in nuclear 
policy. The following year, Kargil only reinforced this need for effective C2 mechanisms – both 
states went to war in uncertain states of nuclear alert. The Musharraf regime’s subsequent significant 
resource investment and prioritization of nuclear C2 led to the creation of an effective and tightly 
synced Pakistani National Command Authority (NCA). Thus, the security and safety of Pakistan’s 
nuclear deterrent through personnel screening, permissive action links (PALs), and specialist 
protection details was given precedence. The supposed benefits of the military’s well-defined control 
Potential Future Stressors on  
Indo-Pak C2 
BMD: It is unclear how this emerging Indian 
capability will be integrated with civilian political 
authorities. Who will control its use and how 
will info on incoming threats be distributed? 
Conventional Capabilities, Nuclear Signatures: 
As both states consider employing cruise missiles 
and MLRS systems with conventional and 
nuclear potential, they must figure out launch 
authorities and protocols for reacting to incoming 
dual-use weapons. The presence of ambiguous 
threats will require effective C2 structures to 
communicate information quickly to decision 
nodes. 
Targeting: Given the rise in precision weaponry, 
how will both states’ military and political 
apparatuses navigate the targeting of sensitive 
dual-use targets with implications for escalation?  
Non-Permissive Operating Environments: 
Many scenarios exist where enemy action 
incapacitates established C2 networks. Yet, 
deterrent minded redundancies and SOPs still 
seem undeveloped. 
Deterrence at Sea: Custody issues abound 
regarding the deployment of nuclear weapons on 
surface and sub-surface combatants. 
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were said to enhance Pakistani nuclear doctrine by enabling a tightly articulated – if outwardly 
ambiguous – weapons policy that ensured smooth transition from the conventional to nuclear realm. 
Yet, this rigorous internal C2 system fits awkwardly into Pakistan’s current political environment 
and is disquieting especially since the revelations of AQ Khan’s erstwhile network still resonates in 
international circles. Under the NCA’s authority, the SPD has performed admirably, especially in the 
realm of nuclear security.11 Since the 2010 legislation, Pakistan’s civilian leadership has increased its 
role and involvement in nuclear oversight and decision-making mechanisms. Given the precedence, 
however, the Army still remains the key voice on nuclear issues. Going forward, C2 systems are 
likely to evolve more robustly than in the previous decade in both countries. Gradually, the Indian 
military and the Pakistani civilians will get more firmly into the loop of decision making in their 
respective nuclear command system.   
Conclusions 
Multiple proposals to strengthen nuclear learning emerged at the two conferences and roundtable 
sessions organized for the South Asian Nuclear Learning project. While some remain unworkable as 
long as an intense Indo-Pak rivalry persists, others provide tangible objectives that both sides can 
strive for in the current strategic environment.  
In the next decade, both India and Pakistan will likely undergo NCA reforms for a variety of reasons. 
Despite some of the efficiencies put in place in the past 15 years, new implications will arise due to 
democratic shifts, technological advances, and increased joint leadership due to the shifting emphasis 
in the roles of the Navy and Air Force. 
Pakistan’s current NCA includes civilian and military leaders but its operating procedure may require 
reevaluation, especially given the country’s new political direction where legal authorities and 
political legitimacy continue to fluctuate. Subtle reforms may be necessary given the recent 
democratic transitions and civil rule, and introduction of new weapon systems that would eventually 
result in the triad. Instead of an Army-dominated system, the new decade may require more joint 
leadership on nuclear issues in both civilian as well as the tri-service command structure.  
Some Pakistani observers believe the military remains too focused on capability development at the 
cost of other elements to ensure deterrence and survivability. For example, the hardening of C2 
through physical and technical means and the expansion of redundant space-based C2 will continue 
to lag behind. Overall, Pakistan will continue to face challenges in finding the appropriate balance 
between measures to prevent unauthorized nuclear weapon use and measures to strengthen C2 from 
decapitating strikes. This implies strengthening of ISR, instituting a more robust C2 network, and 
developing a more sophisticated internal nuclear management system. In the future, these elements 
must be a higher priority rather than simply expanding arsenals for “more deterrence.” 
11  Pakistan has been rated amongst the top of nuclear weapons capable state to have taken maximum nuclear 
security measures in the Second Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) Report of 2014. For details see 2014 Nuclear 
Materials Security Index available at http://ntiindex.org. 
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Progress has been made in Indian defense reform despite incessant snubs from New Delhi’s political 
leadership. Most of these calls regard a need for more professional military input into the policy-
making process. One such appeal was for a unified, tri-service command structure in which India’s 
Strategic Forces Command would report to a newly minted Chief of Defense Staff, who would report 
directly to a group headed by the Prime Minister. This group – comprised of the Defense Minister 
and heads of the NCA and National Security Council – could signal a more robust and credible 
Indian deterrent with a centralized and established C2 structure. As a consequence of this reform, the 
professional military’s limited role in nuclear weapon policymaking – where the political-civilian 
sphere dominated – could be modified to the general benefit of Indian decision making. A 
streamlined decision-making process would also be essential in ensuring the effectiveness of 
technical C2 systems. Knowledgeable Indians express admiration for Pakistan’s SPD and its 
supporting role for Pakistan’s NCA. 
Both sides exhibit confusion and misperception in understanding one another’s nuclear signals. The 
creation of an authoritative and mutually acknowledged national source in both countries for 
consistent nuclear signaling would be imperative to enable accurate and perceptible communication. 
In addition, track two efforts can catalogue nuclear signals from both sides in an effort to historicize 
these signals for future South Asia policymakers. 
Managing nuclear capabilities in South Asia has been challenging for the past fifteen years, and 
Indian and Pakistani managers have embarked upon a more evolutionary process of learning through 
trials and tribulations both by themselves and others. Nevertheless, the two countries are new nuclear 
powers so the meanings of nuclear revolutions are more subtle and gradual. This pattern is likely to 
continue in the next decade. The following chapters in this volume explain in greater detail the 
varying perceptions of Indian and Pakistani authors.  
